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Critique-Inspired Pedagogies in
Canadian Criminal Law Casebooks:
Challenging “Doctrine First, Critique
Second” Approaches to First-Year
Law Teaching

This article is a critical evaluation of Canadian criminal law casebooks. The
author explores the aims, practices, and challenges of these teaching texts by
examining their relationship to critique-inspired pedagogical methods. A number
of English-language Canadian criminal law casebooks add a welcome feature
to the Canadian common law teaching landscape: all but one of six recently
published casebooks teach doctrine and critique together. The research builds on
an emerging scholarship of Canadian legal education by demonstrating evidence
of critical political commitments and critique-inspired teaching methods within
Canadian criminal law education. Yet casebook editors and other professors who
utilize critical methods acknowledge challenges of teaching doctrine from critical
standpoints. These discoveries lead the author to suggest that emphasizing the
goals of teaching critique, including producing more effective lawyers and creating
learning environments that value student diversity, will be helpful for moving
forward with critique-inspired teaching.
Dans le présent article, l’auteure présente une évaluation critique des recueils de
jurisprudence en droit pénal canadien. Elle explore les objectifs, les pratiques et
les défis que comportent ces textes d’enseignement en examinant leur relation
avec les méthodes pédagogiques inspirées de la critique. Un certain nombre de
recueils de jurisprudence en droit pénal canadien de langue anglaise ajoutent
une caractéristique bienvenue au paysage de l’enseignement de la common
law au Canada : tous les recueils de jurisprudence récemment publiés, sauf un,
enseignent la doctrine et la critique ensemble. La recherche s’appuie sur une
nouvelle étude de l’enseignement du droit au Canada en démontrant l’existence
d’engagements politiques critiques et de méthodes d’enseignement inspirées de
la critique dans l’enseignement du droit pénal au Canada. Pourtant, les éditeurs
de recueils de jurisprudence et d’autres professeurs qui utilisent des méthodes
critiques reconnaissent les défis de l’enseignement de la doctrine à partir de points
de vue critiques. Ces découvertes amènent l’auteure à suggérer que l’accent mis
sur les objectifs de l’enseignement de la critique, y compris la production d’avocats
plus efficaces et la création de milieux d’apprentissage qui valorisent la diversité
des étudiants, sera utile pour aller de l’avant avec un enseignement inspiré de la
critique.
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Introduction
I. Critique-inspired pedagogies: Aiming to enhance and broaden legal
skills and aiming to effectively teach diverse students
II. Doctrine-first teaching in English-language Canadian criminal law
casebooks
1. “This casebook deals primarily with general principles of
criminal law and with defences”: Schmeiser
2. “Our students need to be informed before they can be truly
critical”: Stuart
III. Critique-inspired teaching in English-language Canadian Criminal
Law casebooks
1. Towards a critique-inspired approach: Criminal Law’s contexts
in Friedland/Roach
2. “Critically examining the traditional approach to criminal law”:
Saunders
3. Beginning with “people’s lives”: Pickard
4. “Relations of power”: Abell
Conclusions: The challenge of pursuing critique-inspired teaching
instead of doctrine-first teaching

Introduction
“A tension exists between the need to deliver an understanding of legal
doctrine and theory, along with traditional lawyering skills, and the
parallel obligation to engage students in the critical analysis of those
rules and skills.” – Julia Tolmie1

In common-law law schools, professors portray law teaching as involving
two competing demands—teaching doctrine and teaching critique.2
Teaching doctrine has come to stand for the practice of teaching a narrow
conception of law by focusing on the legal rules and reasoning that emanate
1.
Julia Tolmie, “Introducing Feminist Legal Jurisprudence Through the Teaching of Criminal Law”
in Kris Gledhill & Ben Livings, eds, The Teaching of Criminal Law: The Pedagogical Imperatives
(New York: Routledge, 2017) 173 at 175.
2.
See e.g. ibid; Okianer Christian Dark, “Incorporating Issues of Race, Gender, Class, Sexual
Orientation, and Disability into Law School Teaching” (1996) 32:3 Willamette L Rev 541 at 551;
David Sandomierski, Aspiration and Reality in Legal Education (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2020) [Sandomierski, Aspiration and Reality].
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from case law. Scholars describe doctrine-focused teaching as formalist
and affiliate it with Harvard Law School professor and dean, Christopher
Columbus Langdell.3 Langdell is regarded as having written the first
casebook, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts, in 1871.4 In it,
Langdell claims that using cases is the most effective way “of mastering
the doctrine”:
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines…
Each of these doctrines has arrived at its present state by slow degrees;
in other words, it is a growth, extending in many cases through centuries.
This growth is to be traced in the main through a series of cases; and
much the shortest and best, if not the only way of mastering the doctrine
effectually is by studying the cases in which it is embodied.5

The formalist, or case method, approach to teaching doctrine captures the
idea that judicial cases contain rules that can be studied and applied on
their own, without concern for the social contexts from which they emerge
or for their broader social consequences.6
By comparison, teaching critique is the practice of teaching perspectives
and skills that challenge doctrine’s claims to logic and justice. Teaching
critique recognizes that: judicial analysis leaves out lots of perspectives,
experiences and other laws and often further marginalizes people who live
in contexts of oppression. Judicial analysis thus does not always provide
sufficient or appropriate resources for dealing with the problems that law
confronts. Teaching critique can identify, emphasize, and contest the
violence and oppression that doctrine (re)produces. Scholars align these
practices with teaching students how to promote the needs and interests
of vulnerable, marginalized, and oppressed communities and individuals.7
These approaches reflect the political and academic commitments of
3.
See e.g. Elizabeth Mertz, The Language of Law School: Learning to “Think Like a Lawyer”
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 26; Sandomierski, Aspiration and Reality, supra note 2 at
44.
4.
Christopher Columbus Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts: With References
and Citations, prepared for Use as a Text-Book in Harvard Law School (Boston: Little, Brown & Co,
1871).
5.
Ibid at vi.
6.
Sandomierski, Aspiration and Reality, supra note 2 at 45.
7.
See generally e.g. Dark, supra note 2; Deborah Zalesne, “Racial Inequality in Contracting:
Teaching Race as a Core Value” (2013) 3:1 Colum J of Race & L 23; Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw,
“Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education” (1994) 4:1 S Cal Rev L &
Women’s Stud 33; Arlene S Kanter, “The Law: What’s Disability Studies Got to Do With It or an
Introduction to Disability Legal Studies” (2011) 42:2 Colum HRLR 403; Khylee Quince, “Teaching
Indigenous and Minority Students and Perspectives in Criminal Law” in Kris Gledhill & Ben Livings,
eds, The Teaching of Criminal Law: The Pedagogical Imperatives (New York: Routledge, 2017) 162;
Tolmie, supra note 1.
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critical legal studies, which seeks to unveil the political nature of law and
transform it for the betterment of oppressed individuals and groups,8 of
law and society, or sociolegal, studies, which brings methodologies and
insights from the social sciences into the study of law,9 and of scholars
who seek to respond to calls to Indigenize the law school curriculum.10
This article is a critical evaluation of Canadian criminal law casebooks.
I explore the aims, practices, and challenges of these teaching texts by
examining their relationship to doctrinal and critical methods. The article
is rooted in the idea that casebooks provide insight into how law students
are taught to “think…about law and legal practice.”11 The research
also builds on an emerging scholarship of Canadian legal education. In
particular, it expands on the insights in David Sandomierski’s recent book,
which shows that Canadian common law contracts professors demonstrate
a preference for teaching “doctrine first, critique second”12—specifically,
a preference for teaching judicial reasoning first and critiques of that
reasoning second.13 As Sandomierski argues, these approaches convey the
ideas that judicial reasoning “has a comprehensible, identifiable, distinctive
core” and “that subjecting the core to critique is not particularly important,
or at least not of equal importance to communicating that core.”14 Yet,
despite the overwhelming practice of teaching doctrine before critique,
Sandomierski also found that many contract law professors nevertheless
identified value in teaching critique and aspired to do so.15 In particular,
Sandomierski found that most contract law professors do not teach much
critique in practice. However, their reasons for nonetheless desiring to
teach theory and critical perspectives are generally “instrumental and
practical” in nature: teaching theory and critical perspectives equips
students to become “‘better lawyers.’”16
In this article, I illuminate the ways in which English-language criminal
law casebook editors in Canada have taken up the challenge of working
8.
See Sandomierski, Aspiration and Reality, supra note 2 at 60-61.
9.
See Kanter, supra note 7 at 442.
10. On the meanings of, and differences between, Indigenizing and decolonizing law schools, see
Jeffery G Hewitt, “Decolonizing and Indigenizing: Some Considerations for Law Schools” (2016)
33:1 Windsor YB Access Just 65.
11. Janet Ainsworth, “Law in (Case)books, Law (School) in Action: The Case for Casebook Reviews”
(1997) 20:2 Seattle UL Rev 271 at 275. See also David Sandomierski, “Tension and Reconciliation
in Canadian Contract Law Casebooks” (2017) 54:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 1181 [Sandomierski, “Canadian
Contract Law Casebooks”].
12. Sandomierski, Aspiration and Reality, supra note 2 at 240.
13. Ibid at 240-244.
14. Ibid at 240.
15. Ibid, ch 4, 5.
16. Ibid at 38.
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against the grain as all but one17 of six recently published casebooks teach
doctrine and critique together.18 I use the term critique-inspired pedagogies
to capture the alternative teaching method—engaging with doctrine from
critical standpoints.
I take the position that critique-inspired approaches are preferable
to doctrine-first approaches, drawing on the arguments presented in
scholarship on teaching minority, feminist, Indigenous, class, disability,
and critical race perspectives in legal education. Specifically, this body
of literature identifies two compelling overarching objectives of critiqueinspired teaching. First, consistent with Sandomierski’s findings, critiqueinspired teaching aims to equip law students with skills to be “better
lawyers”19—to be aware of, and responsive towards, diverse experiences
and oppressive legal structures. Critique-inspired approaches are
intimately connected with social justice goals that aim to teach students
about eradicating inequalities and oppression and about the challenges of,
and possible pathways for, working towards those goals. Second, critiqueinspired teaching aims to create learning environments that value student
diversity.20
I turn first to the goals of critique-inspired teaching and then conduct
a textual analysis of English-language Canadian criminal law casebooks.21
My main interest lies in studying 21st century casebooks. However, I
17. Don Stuart & Steve Coughlan, Learning Canadian Criminal Law, 14th ed (Toronto: Thomson
Reuters Canada, 2018) [Stuart]. When this article was already at the proof stage, a new edition of
Stuart was published (Don Stuart & Steve Coughlan, Learning Canadian Criminal Law, 15th ed
(Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada, 2021)). Regrettably, I have not had the opportunity to incorporate
the 2021 edition into this article.
18. See Kent Roach et al, Criminal Law and Procedure: Cases and Materials, 11th ed (Toronto:
Emond, 2020) [Roach]; RP Saunders & Rebecca Bromwich, Criminal Law in Canada: An
Introduction to the Theoretical, Social and Legal Contexts, 5th ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2016)
[Saunders]; Toni Pickard et al, Dimensions of Criminal Law, 3d ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery,
2002) [Pickard]; Jennie Abell, Elizabeth Sheehy & Natasha Bakht, Criminal Law & Procedure: Cases,
Context, Critique, 5th ed (Concord: Captus Press, 2012) [Abell, Volume I]; Jennie Abell, Elizabeth
Sheehy & Natasha Bakht, Criminal Law & Procedure: Proof, Defences, and Beyond, 5th ed (Concord:
Captus Press, 2014) [Abell, Volume II].
19. Zalesne, supra note 7 at 27; Kanter, supra note 7 at 405.
20. Crenshaw, supra note 7; Quince, supra note 7; Zalesne, supra note 7 at 46-47; Charles R
Calleros, “Training a Diverse Student Body for a Multicultural Society” (1995) 8 La Raza LJ 140
at 144-45; Alice K Dueker, “Diversity and Learning: Imagining a Pedagogy of Difference” (1991)
19:1 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 101 at 111-120; Susan Bisom-Rapp, “Contextualizing the Debate:
How Feminist and Critical Race Scholarship Can Inform the Teaching of Employment Discrimination
Law” (1994) 44:3 J Leg Educ 366 at 369.
21. I focus on published English-language Canadian criminal law casebooks. Excluded from my
study are textbooks that exclusively aim to teach criminal law to students who do not plan to become
lawyers: see for example, Simon N Verdun-Jones, Criminal Law in Canada: Cases, Questions, and
the Code, 5th ed (Toronto: Nelson Education, 2011) at x. I also excluded criminal law textbooks and
bound course materials.
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provide historical context by examining the first English-language criminal
law casebooks that were published in Canada in the 1960s: Douglas
Schmeiser’s Cases and Comments on Criminal Law (Schmeiser)22; and
Martin Friedland’s Cases and Materials on Criminal Law and Procedure
(Friedland).23 These two casebooks fall into different categories, with
Schmeiser representing a doctrine-first pedagogy and Friedland moving
towards critique-inspired teaching. The books demonstrate that both
doctrine-first and critique-inspired pedagogies have been part of Englishlanguage Canadian criminal law casebooks since their introduction in the
1960s. For the remaining casebooks, I focus primarily on their most recent
editions.
My casebook analysis begins with casebooks that have adopted
“doctrine first, critique second” approaches to criminal law teaching:
Schmeiser and Don Stuart and Steve Coughlan’s Learning Canadian
Criminal Law, most recently published in 2018 (Stuart).24 I then consider
casebooks that have moved towards and employed critique-inspired
approaches: Friedland and the most recent version of Friedland, published
in 2020 and now under the editorship of Kent Roach, Benjamin Berger,
Emma Cunliffe, and Asad Kiyani (Roach)25; RP Saunders and Rebecca
Bromwich’s Criminal Law in Canada: An Introduction to the Theoretical,
Social and Legal Contexts, most recently published in 2016 (Saunders)26;
Toni Pickard, Phil Goldman, Renate Mohr, and Rosemary Cairns-Way’s
Dimensions of Criminal Law, most recently published in 2002 (Pickard)27;
and Jennie Abell, Elizabeth Sheehy, and Natasha Bakht’s two-volume
casebook collection, Criminal Law & Procedure, most recently published
in 2012 (Abell Volume 1)28 and 2014 (Abell Volume 2).29
I analyze each casebook’s conception of the relationship between
doctrine and critique in teaching criminal law. I do so by discussing the
books’ prefaces or introductions, materials that are particularly emblematic
of each book’s approach to teaching doctrine and critique, and each book’s
section on the law surrounding the defence of not criminally responsible
22. Douglas A Schmeiser, Cases and Comments on Criminal Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1966)
[Schmeiser].
23. See Martin Friedland, Cases and Materials on Criminal Law and Procedure, 2d ed (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1968) [Friedland].
24. Stuart, supra note 17.
25. Roach, supra note 18.
26. Saunders, supra note 18.
27. Pickard, supra note 18. Cairns-Way was the primary editor of the third edition (see ibid at v).
However, for consistency with its earlier editions, I refer to the casebook as Pickard throughout.
28. Abell, Volume I, supra note 18.
29. Abell, Volume II, supra note 18.
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on account of mental disorder. I chose to use the mental disorder defence
as a point of comparison between casebooks because the defence is an area
of criminal law doctrine that illuminates “foundational issues—concerning
criminal responsibility and subjectivity—which go to the core of criminal
law.”30 Casebooks that place a priority on teaching critique alongside
doctrine employ critique-inspired pedagogies including: teaching criminal
law within its political, institutional, and social contexts; demonstrating
the relevance of lived experience to criminal law; illuminating the power
relations embedded within criminal law; and showing both the possibilities
and substantial limitations of achieving social justice goals (such as gender
equality, anti-racism, and equality for people living with disabilities)
through Canadian criminal law.
My findings are modest. The prevalence of critique-inspired
approaches in English-language Canadian criminal law casebooks does not
tell us which books are used most frequently in classrooms, and, perhaps
more importantly, my research does not tell us how these books are, or
have been, used or what messages students take from them. Instead, my
research makes the more preliminary point that further inquiry into these
types of questions would be well warranted. The criminal law casebooks
show that several English-language Canadian criminal law casebook
editors have endeavoured to achieve the aspiration, which many contract
law professors also share, of creating better lawyers. However, despite
the availability of critique-inspired approaches, they nonetheless appear
to occupy the margins of Canadian common law teaching. Casebook
editors and other scholars have acknowledged the challenge of adopting
teaching methods and philosophies that go against students’, colleagues’,
and lawyers’ expectations for doctrine-first teaching. This challenge
leads me to suggest that emphasizing and further exploring the goals of
teaching critique will be helpful for moving forward with critique-inspired
pedagogies.

I. Critique-inspired pedagogies: Aiming to enhance and broaden legal

skills and aiming to effectively teach diverse students
Critique-inspired pedagogies involve inserting considerations of identities,
oppression, and power relations into doctrinal legal education on a
continuous basis. Scholars compare this practice to approaches that involve
addressing such considerations only in “specialty or seminar courses,”31

30. Arlie Loughnan, Manifest Madness: Mental Incapacity in Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012) at 3.
31. Zelesne, supra note 7 at 26. See also Bisom-Rapp, supra note 20 at 368.
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raising them only in relation to discrete topics,32 or bringing them into
play only as part of “policy” discussions that are distinctly separated from
“doctrinal” analyses.33 Legal scholars who advocate for incorporating
minority, sexual orientation, feminist, Indigenous, disability, race, and class
perspectives into doctrinal law teaching demonstrate that such practices
provide tools for teaching legal skills and for teaching diverse classrooms.
The pieces of literature that I review share an underlying commitment
to developing both a learning space and a world where the apparent
objectivity, neutrality, and centrality of judicial reasoning is challenged.
The scholars aim to show their students that the assumptions and biases
that permeate judicial reasoning can be rendered visible, contestable,
and representative of ways of knowing and being,—which can privilege
some groups and oppress others. Relatedly, the scholars seek to treat
the experiences, knowledges, and laws of marginalized, vulnerable, and
minority individuals and communities as valid and relevant. The literature
in this section represents of critique-inspired teaching as the authors teach
judicial reasoning while employing critical political commitments both to
shape the framing of that reasoning and to show its alternatives.
Scholars advancing critique-inspired pedagogies identify several
interrelated educational goals. One overarching goal is that critiqueinspired pedagogies will contribute to students’ skills, including their
abilities to identify, understand, and value difference. Scholars relate
such skills to enriching students’ learning outcomes and to enhancing
students’ capacities to respectfully inquire into and appreciate their clients’
experiences, knowledges, backgrounds, and needs in practice.
Critique-inspired pedagogies aim to equip students to see the effects of
the legal system’s treatment of some identities—for example, Indigenous,
woman, queer, disabled, poor—as “deviation[s]”34 from “unstated
norms.”35 Arlene Kanter writes that, like feminist legal studies and critical
race theory, “Disability Studies…offers the law and legal education the
opportunity to critically examine the role of ‘normalcy’ within the law
and within society, generally. It challenges us to examine our unstated
assumptions and requires us to recognize, appreciate, and most importantly,
value differences among us.”36 The practices of learning about and valuing
differences should help students to see the ways in which law creates,
32. Zelesne, supra note 7 at 27.
33. Crenshaw, supra note 7 at 41.
34. Kanter, supra note 7 at 406.
35. Ibid, quoting Martha Minow, Making all the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and the American
Law (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990) at 51.
36. Kanter, supra note 7 at 406.
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legitimizes, and allots differences.37 Disability Studies, Kanter argues,
will enhance these skills, thus “help[ing] our students to become better
lawyers, and perhaps more importantly, help[ing] to promote fairness and
justice in society.”38
Writing from a critical race perspective, Deborah Zalesne similarly
proposes that teachers should affirm that oppression is a regular, systemic
occurrence—that it is built into the foundations of state law—rather
than an isolated, unusual event.39 Like Kanter, Zalesne expressly aims to
create “better lawyers”—lawyers “who are more capable of practicing
law holistically.”40 Zelesne conceptualizes a “holistic” law practice as one
in which students and lawyers “understand the law, how it operates in
our society, and most importantly, how to use it on behalf of clients and
society.”41 She also views new law students as already being equipped
“with values and beliefs about how the law can impact social and political
issues.”42 Rather than stifling these knowledges and capacities, critiqueinspired teaching aims to “get students to bring what they already know
about social mores, cultural values, and historical perspectives to bear
in the class discussion, making cases more ‘real’ and students more
passionate, more analytic, and more confident.”43 Zalesne further places
a responsibility to develop holistic lawyers on all law professors: “Law
professors have a great deal of power because we teach students what to
include and what to exclude in their analysis of the law. It is incumbent
upon law professors to make people of color visible in contracting.”44
Okianer Christian Dark similarly argues that all law professors must
address issues relating to diversity and oppression: “[s]tudents need to
hear all professors address diversity issues…Everyone…is responsible for
changing society so that it is far more inclusive and fair to all members
of the community.”45 With respect to the purposes of critique-inspired
pedagogies, Dark argues that discussions relating to “race, gender, class,
sexual orientation, and disability in law school education” can “aid…
substantially in the intellectual depth and breadth of the law student.”46
Dark maintains that by engaging in these discussions, students will be
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Ibid.
Ibid at 405 [emphasis added].
Zalesne, supra note 7 at 24.
Ibid at 27.
Ibid at 46.
Ibid at 27.
Ibid at 28.
Ibid at 46.
Dark, supra note 2 at 556.
Ibid at 544 [footnotes omitted].

218 The Dalhousie Law Journal

better equipped to construct legal arguments and to recognize doctrine’s
assumptions and subjectivities, which will in turn enable them to identify
its unequal applications.47 Dark is also committed to developing students’
abilities to draw on their own diverse experiences—she sees connections
between legal problem-solving skills and other problem-solving skills. In
particular, Dark argues that teaching students to make those connections
will make them not only better lawyers but also better citizens: students
“should be shown how they might build a bridge between the legal
problem-resolving system and their own so that they can be effective
lawyers and citizens.”48 Furthermore, Dark views legal skills as including
a student’s capacity to care for others. She suggests that “[a]n analysis
of legal materials with an explicit consideration of diversity issues will
strengthen and expand a student’s intellectual capacity, as well as her
capacity for passion and compassion.”49
Angela Harris and Cynthia Lee similarly argue that teaching
students how to critique judicial reasoning, how to seek policy change
through legislation, and how to gain an understanding of the theoretical
underpinnings of criminal law serve the aim of producing better lawyers.50
Harris and Lee argue that their commitments “enhance” the law school
“project of professional training.”51 They edit an American criminal law
casebook that is premised on the claim “that substantive criminal law is
an expressive enterprise: Legislatures pass criminal laws in large part
to reflect their constituents’ moral outrage at certain kinds of behavior.
Moreover…substantive criminal law is inevitably entwined with culture,
and American culture is shot through with subordination on the bases of
race, gender, sexuality, and class.”52 Harris and Lee explain that their goal
is to produce students who do “not just learn what the law is, but [learn] to
think critically about whether it should be the way it is, and if not, how it
ought to be changed.”53
Critique-inspired pedagogies can also involve teaching Indigenous
law in addition to teaching state law and critical perspectives for
understanding state law. For example, Khylee Quince argues that teaching
Indigenous law and legal values can develop students’ abilities to see
people in context and to avoid framing groups of people through their
47. Ibid at 544-551.
48. Ibid at 552.
49. Ibid at 544 [footnote omitted, emphasis added]. See also Bisom-Rapp, supra note 20 at 370.
50. Angela P Harris & Cynthia Lee, “Teaching Criminal Law from a Critical Perspective” (2009) 7:1
Ohio St J of Crim L 261.
51. Ibid at 266.
52. Ibid at 265.
53. Ibid at 265-266.
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representations in state law and state legal processes.54 Quince strives
to achieve these objectives by incorporating Māori law and legal theory
into her first-year criminal law teaching: “[a]s I inform our students, we
are more than a criminogenic profile, which presents us as people with
issues with violence, addictions, and victimisation. Those behaviours
are not who we are—those are symptoms of our marginalisation and
colonisation.”55 Similar to Kanter, Zalesne, and Dark, Quince regards her
teaching practices as being intimately connected with developing better
students and lawyers. She writes that her “strategies…are part of a broader
attempt to mould students into legal thinkers and practitioners who are
mindful and respectful…In respect of legal education and the practice of
law, I view the goal of mindfulness as reflecting the human focus of law as
a discipline centred upon communication and problem-solving.”56
A second, and related, goal of critique-inspired pedagogies is to
foster a classroom environment where diversity is respected, legitimized,
and valued.57 These pedagogies call upon students from privileged
backgrounds to question their assumptions and to recognize multiple ways
of understanding and experiencing the world. As Julia Tolmie writes, “[m]
any of our students will be from backgrounds of relative privilege and will
in their careers be called upon to advocate for, and pass judgment on, those
who occupy social positions and lives that they will never experience. We
are failing these students if we allow them to imagine that their own values
reflect a neutral set of norms that can be non-reflexively applied.”58
At the same time, critique-inspired teaching aims to ease the burdens
carried by minority students and to enhance minority students’ educational
experiences.59 Because white, male, heteronormative, economically
stable, and physically and mentally able experiences and perspectives
dominate law, those experiences and perspectives can easily be cast as
objective, uncontestable norms.60 At the same time, minority experiences
and perspectives can be framed as biased and subjective.61

54. Quince, supra note 7.
55. Ibid at 166.
56. Ibid at 171.
57. See e.g. Frances Lee Ansley, “Race and the Core Curriculum in Legal Education” (1991) 79:6
Cal L Rev 1511 at 1528-1530.
58. Tolmie, supra note 1 at 174.
59. See e.g. Crenshaw, supra note 7; Quince, supra note 7; Calleros, supra note 20; Dueker, supra
note 20; Bisom-Rapp, supra note 20; Zalesne, supra note 7 at 46-47.
60. See Crenshaw, supra note 7 at 35, 48.
61. Ibid at 35-36.
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Kimberlé Crenshaw aims to shift these practices: she writes about
the importance of bringing multiple perspectives into the classroom62 and
about “plac[ing] an entire legal framework at issue.”63 When teachers
introduce multiple, contrasting perspectives, they can “destabilize”
the “apparent objectivity” of legal reasoning.64 “[M]ore importantly,”
teachers “can loosen the constraints upon those who have been forced
to adopt a perspective which is often at odds with their reality.”65
Relatedly, asking students to question a legal framework can contribute
to students’ development of legal skills by “illuminat[ing] better the racial
consequences of dominant values, concepts, and rules.”66 Additionally, and
“[m]ore importantly,” the practice values the knowledges and experiences
of minority students.67 In particular, Crenshaw argues that teaching about,
and questioning the law’s structural generation of power imbalances
“revalues distinct minority experiences; no longer are they cultural
handicaps that either must be overcome or made the subject of occasional
observation. Such experiences are instead, sources of knowledge that can
be legitimately and powerfully utilized in legal analysis.”68 As Crenshaw
continues, “[m]inority students can gain the advantage that their majority
colleagues share: their vision of the world, their experiences and values
and the things that they take for granted can be legitimately included.”69
In the next section, I carry out a textual analysis of English-language
Canadian criminal law casebooks to examine the relationship between
doctrine and critique within the books. Strikingly, several Canadian
criminal law casebooks utilize critique-inspired approaches that pursue the
objective of producing better, or more effective, lawyers. The abundance
of critique-inspired approaches within 21st century Canadian criminal law
casebooks stands in marked contrast to Canadian contract law casebooks,
where only one casebook has pursued an approach of teaching contract
law in its policy context.70 In what follows, I turn first to the Englishlanguage Canadian criminal law casebooks that have adopted “doctrine

62. Ibid at 48.
63. Ibid at 43.
64. Ibid at 48.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid at 43.
67. Ibid at 44.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid [emphasis in original].
70. Angela Swan, Nicholas C Bala & Jakub Adamski, eds, Contracts: Cases, Notes & Materials,
9th ed (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2015). See David Sandomierski, “Canadian Contract Law
Casebooks,” supra note 12 at 1191-1199.
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first, critique second” approaches, and then consider the casebooks that
move towards and embrace critique-inspired pedagogies.

II. Doctrine-first teaching in English-language Canadian criminal law
casebooks

1. “This casebook deals primarily with general principles of criminal
law and with defences”: Schmeiser
The first English-language Canadian criminal law casebook, Cases and
Comments on Criminal Law, was published in 1966 and edited by Douglas
Schmeiser. Schmeiser intended for the book to fill what he described as
nearly a vacuum in Canadian criminal law material.71 While the book was
“compiled as a teaching aid,” Schmeiser added that “practitioners may
find it a convenient reference to leading cases.”72
Schmeiser contains case excerpts along with references to, and a few
excerpts from, legislative provisions, comments (including questions),
and a few excerpts from secondary sources.73 The questions are generally
geared towards testing and sharpening readers’ understanding what the
law is, revealing a commitment to teaching judicial reasoning without
teaching critique. For example, following an excerpt from the Canadian
Encyclopedic Digest concerning “Lack of Criminal Intent,” Schmeiser
asks: “[i]s the formulation of the doctrine of mens rea by the Canadian
Encyclopedic Digest correct?”74 Moreover, Schmeiser guides students in
gaining an understanding of the law by reading cases. For instance, in one
comment, Schmeiser asks readers to consider the following questions: “Is
R. v. Ping Yuen rightly decided? Is it reconcilable with R. v. Regina Cold
Storage, infra? Is it consistent with Beaver v. R., infra? Would the case
be decided the same way today?”75 Given that the tools for analysis are
cases, judicial reasoning is meant to guide students in these evaluations.
The materials and questions are in keeping with Schmeiser’s introductory
statement that “[t]his casebook deals primarily with general principles
of criminal law and with defences.”76 Schmeiser is thus illustrative of
Langdell’s casebook method—a method which implies a belief that law
can (and should) be learned by reading multiple cases on particular points
of law.
71. Schmeiser, supra note 22 at vii.
72. Ibid at vii.
73. See e.g. CED (West, 2nd ed) vol 7 at 328, reproduced in Schmeiser, supra note 23 at 176;
Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on the Law of Insanity (Canada: Queen’s Printer, 1956),
reproduced in Schmeiser, supra note 23 at 476 [McRuer Report].
74. Schmeiser, supra note 22 at 176.
75. Ibid at 228.
76. Ibid at vii.
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A close look at the “Insanity” section reveals, nonetheless, that
Schmeiser saw some limited room for critique. The section reproduces
section 16 of the Criminal Code,77 which provides the statutory framework
for the defence and sets out a list of 13 problems.78 Only two questions
call upon students to exercise their own evaluative judgment: “[a]re
you satisfied with our insanity rules? Can you propose any worthwhile
amendments?”79 These questions represent a small step in the direction of
envisioning students as future law reformers and legislators rather than as
practicing criminal lawyers. Such a vision of criminal law students was
prominent in the American legal academy by this time.80 The approach
also manifests strongly in Friedland, which was a Canadian criminal law
casebook that was published shortly after Schmeiser.81
The comments surrounding case law from other jurisdictions similarly
include reform-oriented questions. For example, one of the cases is from
the United States and sets out a different approach to the defence than
that followed in Canada.82 Schmeiser asks, “[d]o you think the Durham
test is superior to s. 16 of the Criminal Code? Do you think that the result
would be much different in practice?”83 These types of questions not only
ask readers to compare different judicial analyses in different jurisdictions
but also to consider whether changes would make a difference in practice.
Again, these questions suggest that Schmeiser saw some room for critique
in criminal law learning—if only a small and secondary role.
In a review of Schmeiser, Mary Virginia MacLean explains that
the book emerged at a time when the merits of doctrine-centred law
teaching were being debated.84 MacLean observes that “[t]he teaching of
law has been, and still is, an area of turmoil.”85 Criticisms of the case
method included views that students would become “cloud[ed]” by the
plethora of judgments, and thus would not learn to “understand…the basic
principles.”86 While a casebook might eliminate this “cloudiness” through
77. Ibid at 458, citing Criminal Code, SC 1953-54, c 51, s 16. For the most recent statutory
framework, see Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 16.
78. Ibid at 458-59.
79. Ibid at 459.
80. See Anders Walker, “The Anti-Case Method: Herbert Wechsler and the Political History of the
Criminal Law Course” (2009) 7:1 Ohio St J of Crim L 217 at 218, 239-240.
81. Further discussion will be found at 24-26, below.
82. Durham v US, 214 Fed (2d) 862 (App Ct DC Cir 1954), reproduced in Schmeiser, supra note 22
at 480.
83. Schmeiser, supra note 22 at 483.
84. Mary Virginia MacLean, Book Review of Cases and Comments on Criminal Law by DA
Schmeiser, (1967) 5:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 327 at 327.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
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its use of short excerpts from judgments, it can also be regarded as “too
one-sided; that is, the extracts represent the personal choice of the author.”87
Another criticism of the case method is that the practice inhibits students
from learning how to “think”—from understanding “why” judgments say
what they say.88 The “Insanity” chapter demonstrates that Schmeiser was
likely alive to these debates. He likely chose to favour the case method but
was aware of a need to ensure that students grasped “the basic issues”89
and also to devote some time to developing students’ abilities to think
about law reform.
Schmeiser was last published in 1985.90 Despite the debates
surrounding the case method, another Canadian criminal law casebook—
Stuart—has continued to favour a doctrinal introduction to criminal law.
I turn to Stuart next, showing that the casebook illustrates the extension
of doctrine-first teaching in Canadian criminal law and includes a more
explicit claim of the importance of teaching critique after students have
learned to read cases and legislation.

2. “Our students need to be informed before they can be truly

critical”:91 Stuart
A doctrinal introduction to criminal law was evident in the first edition of
Stuart, published in 1982.92 By this time, there was “a growing literature
on Canadian substantive law.”93 In the preface to the first edition, Don
Stuart and Ronald Delisle explain that their aim is to “develop a sound,
basic approach to the subject.”94 They viewed their book as constituting a
source of teaching materials rather than a resource for practitioners.95 This
approach is reminiscent of Langdell’s casebook approach, which involved
“preparing and publishing…a selection of cases as would be adapted to
my purpose as a teacher.”96
Additionally, Stuart and Delisle aimed to adopt a neutral approach:
“[w]e kept our questions and notes to a minimum as we believe criminal

87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Schmeiser, supra note 22 at vii.
90. Douglas A Schmeiser, Canadian Criminal Law: Cases and Comments (Toronto: Butterworths,
1985).
91. Stuart, supra note 17 at v.
92. Don Stuart & Ronald Joseph Delisle, Learning Canadian Criminal Law (Toronto: Carswell,
1982).
93. Ibid at iii.
94. Ibid.
95. “The book is not intended to do double duty and act as a portable library of leading cases for the
practitioner.” (Ibid).
96. Langdell, supra note 4 at vi [emphasis added].
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law teachers who use these materials will wish to be free of our prejudices
in a very controversial subject.”97 Of course, though, as MacLean notes in
her review of Schmeiser, an editor’s choice of materials can still reflect an
editor’s prejudices: choosing to include cases as the primary material for
teaching law, choosing to include particular cases and topics, and choosing
to limit the written comments around cases are necessarily editorial choices
that embed particular presuppositions about the nature of law. In this case,
the editorial choices convey views that appellate reasoning is (or can be)
logical and that criminal law’s controversies can be identified and studied
primarily through a review of cases.
In the 2018 edition of Stuart, Stuart and Coughlan maintain the
commitment to teaching criminal law through substantive criminal law
doctrine. In the introduction, Stuart and Coughlan defend their choice
to focus on doctrine rather than on critique. Their introduction prepares
students for an immersion into criminal law’s doctrinal worldview from
the start, indicating that doctrinal analysis is the cornerstone for becoming
“informed”:
Although the development of a critical perspective is key to any university
environment, we believe it essential to ensure that we provide a full and
complete analysis of the existing laws before we turn to critical analysis.
Our students need to be informed before they can be truly critical…Our
approach throughout has been to concentrate on the major sources: the
Criminal Code itself, key judicial decisions and critical review.98

These same passages can first be found in the fourth edition of Stuart,
edited by Stuart and Delisle and published in 1993.99 In the introduction
to the fourth edition, Stuart and Coughlan specify that the structure of
the “Fault” chapter exemplifies their approach of teaching doctrine and
then critique: “[o]ur students need to be informed before they can be truly
critical. For example, in teaching fault we study the subjective awareness
of risk approach, the extent to which the law presently recognizes absolute
liability and objective standards, types of negligence and Charter standards,
and only then do we consider normative and other critical approaches.”100
The chapter on fault in the 2018 edition maintains the overall format
of doctrine and then critique. Moreover, the secondary source excerpts
in the “Normative Theories” section have remained the same. One of
97. Stuart, supra note 92 at iii.
98. Stuart, supra note 17 at v. See also Sandomierski, Aspiration and Reality, supra note 2 at 240244.
99. Don Stuart & Ronald Joseph Delisle, Learning Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed (Scarborough:
Carswell, 1993) at v.
100. Ibid [emphasis added].
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the excerpts comes from Rosemary Cairns Way’s LLM thesis.101 Cairns
Way encourages “a multidimensional, contextualized approach to fault…
Decisions about responsibility should invoke a rich and multifaceted debate
about the nature and appropriate allocation of blame, the assumption of
free will and the efficacy of the criminal law as a mechanism of social
control.”102 This comment considers Canadian criminal law’s purposes
and claims about people and relationships. The “Normative Theories”
section thus demonstrates that Stuart includes non-judicial frameworks for
understanding and evaluating case law. Yet the inclusion of these critical
accounts at the very end of the fault chapter suggests these perspectives
are an afterthought rather than the main material to be learned. Such a
message would be consistent with Stuart’s objectives.
In the introduction to the 2018 edition, Stuart and Coughlan also
tell readers that “the major focus for studying criminal law in first-year
law school should be on the tools that lawyers and judges must know
and use in the daily business of the conduct of a criminal trial.”103 Stuart
and Coughlan acknowledge “that law students, teachers and lawyers can
better understand law if they seek help from the many disciplines that now
offer insights into the criminal justice system.”104 However, they decide
to devote their “time and energy” to teaching readers about “substantive
principles and the trial context: the adversary system, how the elements of
crime are proved, defences, and sentencing issues.”105
Stuart’s approach takes a particular lawyer-centred perspective as
its starting-point—one that sees judicial reasoning as nearly definitive
of criminal law practice. This approach runs the risk of omitting other
significant aspects of criminal law practice and study. For example, in
notable contrast, Quince offers a frank acknowledgment of the practical,
personal, and emotional difficulties that are faced by criminal law
practitioners and of the importance of teaching students about these
realities:
Alongside the necessary emphasis on doctrinal education should be
some commitment to acknowledging how difficult it can be to work in
the criminal justice field. Criminal practitioners are exposed to evidence,
information, and accounts of extreme human behaviour. We establish

101. Rosemary Cairns Way, The Charter, the Supreme Court and the Invisible Politics of Fault (LLM
Thesis, Queen’s University Faculty of Law, 1992) [unpublished], reproduced in Stuart, supra note 17
at 581.
102. Ibid at 582-583.
103. Stuart, supra note 17 at v.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
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rapport and relationships with wrongdoers and their victims…Criminal
law educators have a responsibility to discuss this openly.106

When the focal point is judicial analysis rather than the impacts that
judicial analysis has and the oppression it generates, teaching materials
have the potential to miss out on (or to acknowledge but cast to the
sidelines) diverse perspectives, values, and experiences that might matter
to people represented in cases, to people with whom students might engage,
and to students and teachers themselves. In terms of professional practice,
Eduardo Capulong argues that teaching methods that leave out clients’
needs can lead to modes of practice that ultimately do not serve clients:
As lawyers, we can be as skilled, devoted, and intrepid as we want. But
without understanding, knowing how to work with, and finding common
cause with our clients—as individuals, organizations, coalitions,
communities, and social movements—and without attending to the
political, social, economic, and historical circumstances in which we,
together, find ourselves, we do our clients a disservice and accomplish
nothing long-term.107

We can see an illustrative example of the limited view of people
that Stuart’s doctrine-first approach generates in the section on “Insanity
(Mental Disorder).” Stuart’s contents in this section epitomize the practice
of viewing people through the lens of appellate courts’ representations of
people, reflecting that “human identity and circumstance are defined by
legal doctrine and formal institutions.”108
In Canadian criminal law doctrine, the image of the rational and
independent individual is especially present in case law relating to the
defence of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.109
This legal subject can be seen in Stuart’s introduction and excerpt from
Cooper v R.,110 decided by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1979. In
their introduction to Cooper, Stuart and Coughlan comment that “[t]he
accused was charged with the murder of a patient at a psychiatric hospital
(the detailed facts and the accused’s psychiatric history are considered
106. Quince, supra note 7 at 171.
107. Eduardo RC Capulong, “Client as Subject: Humanizing the Legal Curriculum” (2016) 23:1
Clinical L Rev 37 at 37.
108. Ibid at 39, citing Ann Shalleck, “Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education” (1993)
45:6 Stan L Rev 1731 at 1737.
109. See e.g. Benjamin L Berger, “Mental Disorder and the Instability of Blame in Criminal Law”
in François Tanguay-Renaud & James Stribopoulos, eds, Rethinking Criminal Law Theory: New
Canadian Perspectives in the Philosophy of Domestic, Transnational, and International Criminal
Law (Oxford: Hart, 2012) 117.
110. Cooper v R (1979), [1980] 1 SCR 1149, 13 CR (3d) 97, reproduced in Stuart, supra note 17 at
789 [Cooper].
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below)…[T]he Court discussed the meaning of the term ‘disease of the
mind’ and explained what is entailed by ‘appreciating’ the nature and
quality of an act or omission.”111 Immediately, the editors introduce
Gary Cooper without referring to his first-hand personal experiences and
identities. They instead refer to his identity only as an accused person in
a murder trial. Because this case involves the defence of mental disorder,
it specifically brings into question whether Gary Cooper fits within the
law’s presumed depiction of someone who can be held responsible—a
depiction that involves human capacities for understanding one’s actions
and the consequences resulting from them. In particular, Justice Dickson
quoted with approval the following passage from the McRuer Report:
“The true test necessarily is, was the accused person at the very time of the
offence—not before or after, but at the moment of the offence—by reason
of disease of the mind, unable…to appreciate not only the nature of the act
but the natural consequences that would flow from it?”112 The person with
whom criminal law claims to be concerned is thus an individual who has,
among other features, the “ability to perceive the consequences, impact
and results of a physical act.”113
In addition to case excerpts and comments, Stuart’s section on
mental disorder contains a few critical commentaries on psychiatry. For
instance, Stuart and Coughlan write that, “[w]ith any psychiatric label,
and [‘psychopathic syndrome’] in particular, lawyers should request that
psychiatrists be as precise as possible in their descriptions of the actual
behaviour of the individual before the court rather than hide behind their
imperfect abstractions. Clearly they are too imprecise for use as legal criteria
of responsibility.”114 Similarly, they note, “[m]odern critics complain that
the [Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders] categories are
still not the subject of scientifically verified research, that they have grown
exponentially, that psychiatrists too often tend to blindly rely on them
to prescribe psychoactive drugs, and that psychiatrists have become too
beholden to the pharmaceutical industry.”115 This latter comment follows
an excerpt from TS Szasz’s “Psychiatry, Ethics and the Criminal Law.”116
111. Stuart, supra note 17 at 789.
112. Cooper in Stuart, supra note 110 at 793, quoting McRuer Report, supra note 73 at 13.
113. Cooper in Stuart, supra note 110 at 793.
114. Stuart, supra note 17 at 781.
115. Ibid at 782, citing Marcia Angell, “The Illusions of Psychiatry”, The New York Review of Books
(14 July 2011). The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is currently in its fifth
edition: American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
5th ed (Arlington: American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
116. TS Szasz, “Psychiatry, Ethics and the Criminal Law” (1958) 58:2 Colum L Rev 183, reproduced
in Stuart, supra note 17 at 781.
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In this excerpt, Szasz criticizes the idea that psychiatrists and jurors can
make factual findings of mental illness, arguing instead that these findings
are actually theories of illness: “if the notion of ‘mental illness’ means
anything, it means that it is the theory by means of which we ‘explain’ how
the events in question might have occurred.”117
These critiques helpfully highlight the law’s practice of making
determinations with respect to the mental disorder defence by considering,
but not solely relying upon, psychiatrists’ diagnoses. Unfortunately, the
discussion stops short of questioning readers about their own perceptions
of connections between mental disabilities and criminal responsibility.
Similarly, the discussion excludes comments about the discrimination
faced by people living with mental disabilities, both within and outside
the legal system.
Given that Stuart and Coughlan explicitly decide, in their preface, to
take a doctrine-first approach to teaching criminal law, teaching criminal
law in the way they do is fitting. In identifying some critiques of this
approach, I do not mean to isolate Stuart. Indeed, most contract law
casebooks take a similar approach.118 And, as other Canadian criminal law
casebook editors also seem to indicate, I also think that learning how to
read judicial reasoning, and how to communicate within it, is an important
skill.119 I have identified some critiques as part of my effort to illustrate
that when evaluated from a critique-inspired perspective a “doctrine first,
critique second” approach leaves out, or casts to the sidelines, much of
people’s varied experiences and values (including those of students
themselves and of people whom students read about in cases) and of
criminal law’s actual impacts.

III. Critique-inspired teaching in English-language Canadian Criminal
Law casebooks

1. Towards a critique-inspired approach: Criminal Law’s contexts in
Friedland/Roach
Martin Friedland first published Cases and Materials on Criminal Law
and Procedure in 1967—one year after Schmeiser first published Cases
and Comments on Criminal Law.120 As MacLean notes in her review of
117. Ibid at 782.
118. See generally Sandomierski, “Canadian Contract Law Casebooks,” supra note 11; Sandomierski,
Aspiration and Reality, supra note 2.
119. See also Dark, supra note 2.
120. The first edition of Friedland was a temporary version. See Friedland, supra note 24 at v. See also
RS Mackay, Book Review of Cases and Materials on Criminal Law and Procedure, by ML Friedland,
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Schmeiser, this was a time when debates about the case method were
taking place.121 A 1965 study similarly documents that the casebook
method was still in use in the United States.122 However, adaptations of
the method had emerged.123 With respect to criminal law, Anders Walker
argues that a shift in teaching method took place in the United States
beginning in the 1930s.124 Walker argues this shift was apparent in Jerome
Michael and Herbert Wechsler’s preparation of a new kind of criminal
law casebook, Criminal Law and its Administration: Cases, Statutes, and
Commentaries125 in the 1930s.126 While traces of this shift are evident in
Schmeiser, the shift appears to have had a stronger influence on Friedland.
According to Walker’s research, Wechsler and Michael aimed to “open
students’ eyes to law’s interrelationship with society,”127 incorporating a
smaller number of cases than a leading 1894 criminal law casebook128 and
an assortment of materials coming from sources such as law review articles,
scholarly books, commission reports, and legislation from jurisdictions
outside the United States.129 Notes in the casebook ask probing questions,
encouraging students to consider, for example, whether they agree with
the argument presented by a scholar.130 Walker further maintains that
Wechsler and Michael’s approach has continued to influence criminal
law teaching throughout the United States. Drawing on Laura Kalman’s
research, which identified the book as “the first law school casebook to
successfully synthesize social science materials with cases,”131 Walker
argues that the book proceeded to “inspir[e] a generation of criminal law
teachers to organize their courses along similar lines.”132
The move away from including only (or primarily) appellate case
law in criminal law casebooks took place in the United States and
2d ed, (1969) 19:3 UTLJ 445 at 445-446.
121. See generally MacLean, supra note 84.
122. Arthur D Austin, “Is the Casebook Method Obsolete?” (1965) 6:2 Wm & Mary L Rev 157.
123. Ibid.
124. Walker, supra note 80.
125. Jerome Michael & Herbert Wechsler, Criminal Law and Its Administration: Cases, Statutes, and
Commentaries (Chicago: Foundation Press, 1940).
126. Walker, supra note 80 at 228, 218, n 5. The first edition was officially published in 1940.
127. Walker, supra note 80 at 219, citing interview by Norman Silber and Geoffrey Miller with
Herbert Wechsler, Professor, Columbia University School of Law, in New York City, NY (11 August
1978; 23 February 1979; 12 & 13 March 1982).
128. Walker, supra note 80 at 220, citing Joseph Henry Beale, Jr, A Selection of Cases and Other
Authorities upon Criminal Law (Cambridge: Harvard Law Review Publication Association, 1894).
129. Walker, supra note 80 at 229.
130. Ibid at 230.
131. Ibid at 218, citing Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale, 1927–1960 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1986) at 90, 97.
132. Walker, supra note 80 at 218.
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Australia.133 In both places criminal law was a subject area that came to
serve as a site for teaching the criminal process, criminal law’s moral and
philosophical questions, and legislative reform, in addition to appellate
case law. The approach has been aligned with legal realism, which, as
a school of thought, had influences on both critical legal studies and the
law and society movement.134 Moreover, Wechsler and Michael’s “anticase method”135 has been connected with reimagining the role of the law
student. The shift in the United States involved a vision of the law student
as a future legislator and law reformer, rather than as a criminal defence
lawyer or prosecutor.136 The introduction of a criminal law textbook in
Australia in 1962 imagined the law student as a morally aware, “serious,
reform-orientated, critical” future lawyer.137
Similar to these developments, Friedland contains traces of Wechsler
and Michael’s “anti-case method.”138 Notably, Friedland bears particular
resemblance to one American criminal law casebook that followed in
Wechsler and Friedland’s footsteps—Monrad Paulsen and Sanford
Kadish’s Criminal Law and Its Processes: Cases and Materials, first
published in 1962 (Kadish).139 Kadish and Friedland are similar in that
they both bring together criminal procedure and substantive criminal law.
Additionally, they both include a discussion of the relationship between
criminal law and morality early on, including excerpts from the Report
of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution140 and from
Devlin’s “The Enforcement of Morals.”141
Friedland aimed to integrate the various components of the criminal
law process and to incorporate discussion and reflection on criminal
law’s scope and aims.142 An emphasis on teaching criminal law in its
133. On the United States, see generally Walker, supra note 80. On Australia, see Susan Bartie, Free
Hands and Minds: Pioneering Australian Legal Scholars (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2019) at ch 4.
134. Harris & Lee, supra note 50 at 264-66.
135. See generally Walker, supra note 80.
136. Ibid at 217-18. But see Harris & Lee, supra note 50 (arguing that policy and practice could be
viewed as more connected than Walker presents them) at 263-264.
137. Bartie, supra note 133 at 65, 71.
138. Walker, supra note 80.
139. Monrad G Paulsen & Sanford H Kadish, Criminal Law and Its Processes: Cases and Materials
(Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1962) [Kadish]. On Kadish, see Walker, supra note 80 at 218-219, 238244.
140. UK, The Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (1957), reprinted in
Kadish, supra note 139 at 5, and in Friedland, supra note 23 at 64.
141. Patrick Devlin, “The Enforcement of Morals” (Maccabaean Lecture in Jurisprudence of the
British Academy, 1959), reprinted in Kadish, supra note 139 at 8, and in Friedland, supra note 23 at
66.
142. “Such areas as the relationship between law and morality, criminal procedure, and sentencing—
formerly reserved for an optional course in the third year—are examined here.” (Friedland, supra note
23 at v.)
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context appears in the second chapter, which deals with pre-arraignment
procedures. The chapter begins with a description of the process in
Toronto: “[a]n arrested accused is taken to one of the many police division
stations in Toronto, ‘booked,’ lodged in a cell, and, for indictable offences,
fingerprinted and photographed. He is liable to be questioned at any time
while in police custody.”143 The explanation focuses on practical aspects
of the criminal process that would be important to people who are arrested
and charged.
Friedland’s chapter on “Insanity” begins with the “stages of criminal
process in which insanity may be relevant.”144 Similar to the chapter on
pre-arraignment procedures, the procedural content highlights some
of the practical experiences faced by accused persons and offenders.
Additionally, by drawing readers’ attention to procedural practices and
legal rules that exist in other jurisdictions, Friedland, like Schmeiser,
demonstrates that law and law’s procedures constitute choices about how
to depict, treat, and respond to people. For instance, the sentencing section
in the insanity chapter includes a discussion of law reform that took place
in England around the Mental Health Act, 1959,145 which enabled courts to
make hospital orders, leading to offenders “being compulsorily admitted
to hospital.”146 In introducing this excerpt, Friedland commented that this
English procedure “has no counterpart in Canada.”147
Friedland’s contextual approach to criminal law teaching has carried
on with the continued publication of Cases and Materials in Criminal
Law and Procedure. The 2020 edition (Roach) shows that judicial
analysis exists within broader social, political, institutional, procedural,
and historical contexts. In the preface the editors write that this edition
“include[s] fuller extracts of leading cases” along with “more secondary
and contextual readings, giving students access to scholarly and policy
literature on the criminal law while enriching the text’s attention to issues
of Indigenous justice, racial and ethnic bias, gender in the criminal law, and
other matters of deep social importance to the criminal justice system.”148
The editors also note that “[t]he years have…confirmed the wisdom of

143. Ibid at 14.
144. Ibid at 278.
145. Mental Health Act, 1959 (UK), 7 & 8 Eliz II, c 72.
146. RM Jackson, Enforcing the Law (London: Macmillan & Co, 1967), reprinted in Friedland, supra
note 23 at 285-286.
147. Ibid at 285.
148. Roach, supra note 18 at ix.
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Professor Friedland’s original decision to teach criminal law in its broader
procedural, theoretical, social, and institutional context.”149
Roach’s contextualized approach to criminal law teaching is
demonstrated in the book’s case study of the wrongful conviction of Donald
Marshall Jr. This case study depicts people who have different forms of
involvement with criminal law—for example, defendants, witnesses,
police officers, judges, lawyers—as interrelated with one another and as
embedded within the procedural, institutional, professional-ethical, and
social practices surrounding, and constituting part of, criminal law.150
Donald Marshall Jr.’s “case is examined both as a case study of a
wrongful conviction of an innocent person; the importance and difficulty
of fact-finding in the criminal process; and issues of racism, including the
treatment of Indigenous people in the justice system.”151 The case study
includes the report of the Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr.
Prosecution.152 The excerpts from the Royal Commission’s report focus on
the practices and actions of the various professional people involved in the
process, identifying their racially biased actions and situating the existence
of racialized bias within social and institutional settings. With respect to
police officers, for example, the Commission found that “Sergeant of
Detectives John MacIntyre […] discounted Marshall’s version of events
partly because he considered Marshall a troublemaker and partly because,
in our view, he shared what we believe was a general sense in Sydney
White’s community at the time that Indians were not ‘worth’ as much as
Whites.”153
In a section of the report devoted to “Visible Minorities and the
Criminal Justice System,” the Commission reiterated its finding “that
racism played a part in Donald Marshall Jr.’s wrongful conviction.”154
The Commission “recognize[d] that many of the causes of discrimination
are rooted in institutions and social structures outside the criminal justice
system” and identified “steps” that could, and should, be adopted “to reduce
discrimination in the justice system itself.”155 This acknowledgement of
the pervasiveness of racism demonstrates that the criminal justice system
and the people living within it are affected by, and part of, wider patterns
149. Ibid.
150. The practice of using a case study can also be found in the second edition of Friedland. See
Friedland, supra note 23 at ch 17.
151. Roach, supra note 18 at 232.
152. Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr Prosecution (Halifax: Nova Scotia, 1989),
reprinted in Roach, supra note 18 at 244.
153. Ibid at 245-246.
154. Ibid at 252.
155. Ibid.
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of inequality and discrimination. The book’s inclusion of this analysis
represents a teaching practice that Crenshaw calls upon law teachers to
adopt. In particular, she argues that “the frame should be shifted so as to
illuminate the connection between racial subordination and the values and
interests that appear to be race-neutral or that are simply being taken for
granted.”156
The case study also includes an excerpt from Mary Ellen Turpel’s
“On the Question of Adapting the Canadian Criminal Justice System for
Aboriginal Peoples: Don’t Fence Me In.”157 Turpel draws out conceptions
of people and relationships in Canadian criminal law’s worldview that
do not resonate with those in Indigenous justice systems. For instance,
“professionally trained classes of persons…are deeply distrusted in
Aboriginal cultures because of the experiences with various experts—
experts on education, experts on child welfare, etc.”158 The idea of
involving “stranger[s],” including unknown lawyers, judges, and jurors, in
dealing with a particular event, “is alien and terrifying.”159 Taken together,
the materials in the case study demonstrate that Canadian criminal law’s
representations of people are not created in a vacuum—they come from
and contribute to a wider context, and they miss out on perspectives,
experiences, and laws that also exist within that wider context.
Roach addresses the defence of not criminally responsible on account
of mental disorder in chapter 15, which deals with “Mental Disorder and
Automatism.” Consistent with Roach’s goals of covering criminal law
doctrines in context, the chapter begins with an excerpt from Benjamin
Berger’s piece, “Mental Disorder and the Instability of Blame in Criminal
Law.”160 In this excerpt, Berger discusses the theory of the individual
that underpins the defence of not criminally responsible on account of
mental disorder, that is, the idea that people are depicted in terms of
their abilities in exercising “the capacity for practical reasoning and
cognition.”161 Berger further tells readers that, as applied in current legal
practice, the defence is inconsistent with its own claims about the types
of conditions that implicate criminal responsibility. Berger argues that
conditions that call into question people’s cognitive and reasoning abilities
156. Crenshaw, supra note 7 at 43.
157. Mary Ellen Turpel, “On the Question of Adapting the Canadian Criminal Justice System for
Aboriginal Peoples: Don’t Fence Me In” in Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Aboriginal
Peoples and the Justice System: Report of the National Round Table on Aboriginal Justice Issues
(Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1993), reprinted in Roach, supra note 18 at 263.
158. Ibid at 265.
159. Ibid.
160. Berger, supra note 109, reprinted in Roach, supra note 18 at 782.
161. Ibid.
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are regularly excluded from the scope of the defence.162 As Berger writes,
“[t]he picture painted is of a criminal law chronically detached from or
comfortably ignorant of situations that raise serious concerns within the
best accounts of the conditions for criminal responsibility.”163 Following
the excerpt, the editors summarize Berger’s closing argument as follows:
“Berger ultimately suggests that ‘the under-inclusive doctrine of mental
disorder serves as a mechanism for the elision of collective blame for a
complex social problem’…, allowing us to disregard the difficult issues
of collective, social, and political responsibility that arise at the meeting
of mental health, social disadvantage, and crime.”164 The editors then call
upon readers to “[c]onsider these claims as you study the cases in this
chapter.”165
The excerpt from Berger’s writing and the editors’ surrounding
comments introduce readers to the claims about the human condition that
both characterize the defence of mental disorder and that are not embraced
in its application. Roach helpfully places this excerpt at the start of the
chapter, before the case law. Through this organization, Roach has the
potential to assist readers in seeing that judicial depictions of people
are just that—depictions created by judges. These portrayals might
demonstrate inconsistencies in practice and might not align with what we
otherwise know about people (in this case, knowledge of the number of
people in Canadian prisons and correctional centres who live with mental
health conditions that appear to fit within, but are nonetheless excluded
from, the boundaries of the defence). The editors’ comment about Berger’s
final argument reminds readers that criminal law engages not only in a
practice of depicting the individual appearing before the court, but also
in a practice of depicting the surrounding communities. The defence of
mental disorder is one example of criminal law’s tendency to concentrate
on attributing blame to an individual to the exclusion of identifying ways
in which broader communities could also be held to account.
Roach’s contextualized portrayals of judicial reasoning and of people
involved in criminal law’s processes move strongly in the direction of
showing criminal law’s shortcomings in achieving social justice. Examples
such as the case study of Donald Marshall Jr.’s wrongful conviction and
the early discussion of the narrowness of the mental disorder defence
demonstrate that Roach shows the limits of judicial analysis in dismantling

162.
163.
164.
165.

Ibid at 782-783.
Ibid at 783.
Roach, supra note 18 at 783, citing Berger, supra note 109 at 136.
Roach, supra note 18 at 783.
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power relations. This type of commitment is similarly pursued in another
casebook that was most recently published in 2016—Saunders.

2. “Critically examining the traditional approach to criminal law”:

Saunders
Similar to Roach, Saunders aims to “contextualize…the study of criminal
law in a Canadian setting.”166 Saunders was first published in 1989167 and
most recently published in 2016. Like Roach, Saunders “explores the
historical, theoretical, sociological and political contexts of the criminal
law and its administration.”168 Yet Saunders is more critique-oriented
than Roach. In particular, Saunders “critically examin[es] the traditional
approach to criminal law found in the Criminal Code and the common
law.”169 The editors claim to teach doctrine through critical examination
of it.
Saunders’ critical view of doctrine is exemplified in the chapter,
“Perspectives on Criminal Law.” The introduction to this chapter is written
by Saunders, and he articulates his vision of criminal law as follows:
Criminal law…is a reflection of the views and perspectives of policy
makers on what they want the law, and specifically criminal law, to
accomplish. It is also a reflection of their views on human nature and
human activity, as well as a statement about the potential of the state
to interfere in social conflicts and to control human behaviour in a
meaningful and effective manner.170

Saunders views criminal law as a human-made and human-operated
enterprise. He specifically critiques formalistic approaches to law in the
section on “Traditional Legal Perspectives,” writing that “[t]he essential
criticism of traditional legal approaches is that they are overarchingly
oriented toward the formal manifestations of law and the institutions and
processes that surround those manifestations.”171
Saunders also shows that traditional, formalistic approaches are
embedded in Canada’s legal educational practices: “Law school study
is still focused on the courts, the cases, and the formal rules, in spite of
the calls in the last two decades for more interdisciplinary and socialized
approaches to the study of law.”172 Saunders demonstrates that law
166. Saunders, supra note 18, back cover.
167. Ron P Saunders & Chet N Mitchell, An Introduction to Criminal Law in Context (North York:
Captus Press, 1989).
168. Saunders, supra note 18, back cover.
169. Ibid.
170. Ibid at 51.
171. Ibid at 55.
172. Ibid, citing Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, Law and Learning: Report
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schools continue to teach with a Langdellian approach: “It is a technical,
professional training which teaches students how to argue, manipulate,
and use the rules, and not necessarily to understand the reality and impact
of the rules in their social setting.”173 Saunders urges readers to instead
learn about the actual manifestations of law within social life:
We have to understand that the dilemmas and contradictions in the law
and its stated ideals are very real; that equality is often there in rhetoric
but not in practice; that who you are, the colour of your skin, your income,
your class background and other social, gender and ethnic factors can all
combine to play an important part in the nature and outcome of one’s
interaction with the criminal justice system.174

Saunders regards the impacts of law on people’s lives as being more
important than what formal legal rules claim to be doing. Saunders thus
pursues the critique-inspired objective of creating better lawyers—here,
lawyers who inquire into policy and lived experiences. Additionally, by
offering insight into his own perspectives, he makes it convenient for
readers to hop on board with his views, to feel validated by them, or to
disagree and identify particular points of divergence.
In the “Defence of Mental Disorder” section, Mitchell and Bromwich
briefly comment on the impact of mental disorder law on people’s lived
experiences, noting that “[i]nsanity matters much less now in Canada
because the plea’s outcome most just affects the place and style of
incarceration.”175 They also identify criticisms of “[t]he supposed link
between mental illness and anti-social behaviour.”176 Rather than diving
into the details of these criticisms, Mitchell and Bromwich refer readers
to further readings.
Saunders’ critical approach is similarly pursued in the Pickard
and Abell casebooks. These casebooks also employ interdisciplinary
perspectives—particularly those that point out law’s injustices and power
imbalances—and teach criminal law in its social, political, institutional,
and historical contexts. Like the editors of Saunders, the editors of these
casebooks are also candid about their critical political commitments.

to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Ottawa: Social Science and
Humanities Research Council of Canada, 1983).
173. Saunders, supra note 18 at 55.
174. Ibid.
175. Ibid at 725.
176. Ibid at 726.
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3. Beginning with “people’s lives”: Pickard
Pickard was first published in 1992 and most recently published in
2002. The casebook shows that lived experience is relevant to studying
criminal law. Pickard’s approach is distinctive among Canadian criminal
law casebooks in its engagement with the multiplicity of first-hand
perspectives that are relevant to the study and practice of criminal law,
particularly a study and practice that aspires “to imagine a good criminal
justice system—one that can be, despite its coercive nature, effective and
humane.”177 The book seems to aim to pay heightened attention to lived
experience in order to work towards social justice through criminal law.
Pickard uses both doctrine and critique to develop better students and
future lawyers. The editors’ conception of “better” involves the ability to
think reflectively:
In the end, it is enough if students are better able to think reflectively
about the legal arguments they are learning to fashion…[P]rofessional
training requires the ability to handle the future with intelligence rooted
in a full grasp of essential doctrine and sensitivity toward those features
of our legal and political culture that are driving forces for change in that
doctrine.178

With respect to their social justice commitment, Pickard’s editors
expressly set out to teach students how to make politically informed use
of doctrine and how to understand the doctrine’s political context. The
editors explain in their preface:
We want these materials to help people learn three things: (1) how to
make criminal law arguments from within the self-enclosed world of
doctrinal logic; (2) how to recognize the ways those arguments speak
both from and into a complex political context; and (3) how to articulate
politically informed legal arguments that have communicative power in
legal culture as well as the possibility of contributing to social justice in
this country.179

Toni Pickard and Phil Goldman first articulated these goals in the
preface to the first edition.180 In the preface to the first edition, Pickard
and Goldman explain that they bring together doctrine and materials
from popular culture,181 empirical analysis,182 and the academic fields of
177. Pickard, supra note 18 at xxi.
178. Ibid at xxii-xxiii. See also Toni Pickard & Phil Goldman, Dimensions of Criminal Law (Toronto:
Emond Montgomery, 1992) at xxiii-xxiv.
179. Pickard, supra note 18 at xxi.
180. Ibid.
181. Ibid.
182. Ibid at xxiii.
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“sociology, criminology, political science, feminist jurisprudence, and
social theory.”183 By including a range of interdisciplinary materials,
Pickard and Goldman pursue a critique-inspired approach that involves
teaching readers to be aware of, to appreciate, and to potentially work with
the multiple perspectives that are relevant to criminal law.
In the most recent edition, the first part of the book, “Human
Dimensions,” deals with people whom the law labels as offenders and
victims and then with sentencing. The editors’ exploration of “human
dimensions” at the beginning of the casebook reveals a vision of students
(and of lawyering) that is in marked contrast to the vision that Stuart
embraces. Rather than viewing students as having no critical voice before
they have mastered judicial analysis, and rather than regarding judicial
analysis and statutory interpretation as the primary tools of criminal
lawyers, Pickard regards students as coming to law school with a rich
variety of experiences and knowledges on which they can draw and as
future lawyers who will need to pay attention to the experiences of the
people with whom they will work. Pickard thus values non-professionalized
perspectives, including those of students themselves and those of people
whom the law categorizes as victims and offenders.
The first chapter offers glimpses into some of the possible emotional,
physical, and social experiences of survivors and criminalized people.
Readers encounter, for example, Bruce Shapiro’s reflective article on
being “a victim of random violence,”184 in which he observes that rather
than operating as individualized “fight-or-flight” agents, “in the confusion
and panic of life-threatening attack, people reached out to one another.”185
The second chapter of the casebook, and the final chapter within
the “Human Dimensions” part, deals with sentencing rules, practices,
and issues. The editors’ decision to use sentencing as the casebook’s first
doctrinal component seems to be informed by their vision of lawyers
as professionals who work not simply with legal rules but also—and
importantly—with people. The editors focus on sentencing at the beginning
of the casebook because sentencing “represents the sole experience of the
process for most people who come into conflict with the law.”186

183. Ibid at xxii.
184. Bruce Shapiro, “Anatomy of an Assault: A Victim of Random Violence Ponders Our Culture of
Crime” (July-August 1995), Utne Reader 51-57, adapted from (April 3, 1995), The Nation, reprinted
in Pickard, supra note 18 at 49.
185. Ibid at 52 [emphasis in original].
186. Ibid at xxi.
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Readers learn about “[t]he reality of sentencing law” by reading
case law.187 Yet the editors are careful to show that people’s experiences
extend beyond the sentencing hearing. For instance, readers learn about
an incarcerated person’s experience in solitary confinement through an
excerpt from McCann et al v The Queen et al.188 The excerpt relays the
evidence given by Andrew Bruce, who had spent time in the British
Columbia Penitentiary’s solitary confinement unit. Readers learn about
the size and contents of Bruce’s cell—an 11’2” by 6’6” space containing
plywood, a thin foam mattress, two blankets and sheets, a foam pillow
and a pillowcase, a combination toilet/washbowl, an air vent, and a radio
outlet.189 When describing his time in solitary confinement, Bruce said,
“You get twisted about it. Your frustration turns to hate towards the guards
and all the people who keep you there.”190
Pickard covers the defence of not criminally responsible on account
of mental disorder in its second part, “Doctrinal Dimensions.” In the
“Mental Disorder” section, the editors appeal to the reader’s own
intuitions and perspectives. For example, the editors follow up on cases
with the following types of questions: “Put yourself in the position of a
jury member in either the Abbey or Chaulk trial. What questions would
you ask with respect to the evidence if you were instructed pursuant to
each of these alternative formulations? Would your decision change?
Which do you find most appropriate in terms of your personal view of the
relationship between mental disease and responsibility?”191 The questions
continue: “Now put yourself in the position of defence counsel. What
differences do the various tests make in the evidence you would try to
develop and present?”192 These questions resonate with reflective practice,
which Michele Leering has conceptualized as “reflection on practice or
technique (skills), critical (knowledge), and self-reflection (values),” along
with “reflecting in community” and “becoming an integrated reflective
practitioner.”193 While an in-depth analysis of reflective practice is beyond
the scope of this paper, Pickard’s reflective prompts demonstrate that
reflection is one of the learning outcomes and legal skills that critiqueinspired pedagogies might aim to foster. The method of envisioning the

187. Pickard, supra note 18 at 130.
188. McCann et al v The Queen et al [1976] 1 FC 570, reprinted in Pickard, supra note 18 at 210.
189. Ibid at 210.
190. Ibid.
191. Pickard, supra note 18 at 617 [emphasis added].
192. Ibid.
193. Michele Leering, “Conceptualizing Reflective Practice for Legal Professionals” (2014) 23 J L &
Soc Pol’y 83 at 94.
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student as a reflective practitioner is at odds with a vision of the lawyer
as someone who primarily works with and learns from judicial analysis.
Reflective practice recognizes that students (and law professionals) bring
with them an array of knowledges and perspectives and will need to find
ways to sort through connections and tensions between personal values,
professional values and practices, norms and rules contained within
judicial reasons (and conflicts among judicial reasons), and clients’ needs,
values, and experiences.
Pickard makes a distinct contribution to Canadian criminal law
casebooks through its attention to lived experience. Pickard, Goldman,
Mohr, and Cairns-Way demonstrate that criminal law is normative—
it constitutes one perspective that can be significantly at odds with
individuals’ senses of justice and with individuals’ lived experiences. The
alignment of criminal law’s normativity with power relations is further
explored in Abell.

4. “Relations of power”: Abell

In 1993—one year after Pickard entered the market—another critical
criminal law casebook was published: Jennie Abell and Elizabeth
Sheehy’s Criminal Law and Procedure: Cases, Context, Critique.194 In
their introduction to the book, Abell and Sheehy write that the “materials
have been years in the making, having their impetus…in our political
commitments and experience as activists and lawyers, our research
and scholarship, and from five years of interactive teaching with these
materials at the University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law.”195
In a book review, Constance Backhouse writes that Abell Volume
1 “holds the distinction, along with Toni Pickard’s and Phil Goldman’s
Dimensions of Criminal Law…of belonging to a new genre of criminal
casebooks.”196 This is a genre committed to teaching criminal law in a
critical manner by exposing the ways in which criminal law generates and
reproduces social injustices and inequalities.197 These values have carried
on through the most recent versions of the two volumes of Abell, published
in 2012 and 2014.
In the introduction to the first edition of the first volume, Abell and
Sheehy discuss current events in order to illustrate the “tension between
critical legal education and the dominant understanding of the practice
194. Jennie Abell & Elizabeth Sheehy, Criminal Law & Procedure: Cases, Context, Critique (North
York: Captus Press, 1993).
195. Ibid at 2.
196. Constance Backhouse, Book Review of Criminal Law & Procedure: Cases, Context, Critique by
Jennie Abell & Elizabeth Sheehy, (1995) 10:1 CJLS 213 at 213.
197. Backhouse, supra note 196.
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of law.”198 They describe, in particular, a conflict between the Student
Legal Aid Society and the criminal defence bar in Ottawa. The Student
Legal Aid Society had “formed a Women’s Division to address issues
for women who are victims of violence, and then implemented a policy
declining representation of men charged with offences of violence against
their mates.”199 The criminal defence bar was critical of “the policy itself,
the clinic, the law school and its ‘feminist’ agenda, and the individual
students,” and carried out measures including:
…withdrawal of their services from the law school, barring of students
from remand court, news accounts denouncing the clinic as violating the
Charter itself, threats that students who had taken ‘Women and the Law’
courses would never secure employment with local firms, and petitions
to the University, the Ontario Legal Aid Plan, and the Law Society of
Upper Canada to censure the policy or de-fund the clinic.200

Abell and Sheehy thus illustrate some of the lived experiences facing law
students, law professors, and lawyers in dealing with the systemic problem
of violence against women.
As articulated in the most recent edition, Abell Volume 1 aims to
develop students’ “broad understanding of the context, nature, and impact
of the criminal law process in Canada,” while the second volume covers
“issues of ‘substantive’ criminal law.”201 The two volumes are designed to
be used together for teaching a first-year criminal law course or to be used
separately.202 The practices of identifying and critiquing power relations
lie at the heart of both volumes, with the two volumes demonstrating both
the limitations and the potential of doctrine for effecting social change.
In the introduction to the most recent edition of the first volume,
the editors specifically target a particular group of legal educators and
students—those ready to engage with criminal law’s systemic problems,
as well as academics and students who think critically about criminal law
and practice from outside the lawyer-professional mode.203 Abell, Sheehy,
and Bakht further describe the first volume as both “a law casebook” and
“a critique of law.” The book “is…a law casebook, in that it draws on
traditional legal materials, cases, and legislation to illustrate the theoretical
points,” and it is also “a critique of law, in that it examines the impact of
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traditional legal doctrine and law-in-practice.”204 The editors employ “the
themes of feminist analysis, inquiry into colonization, colonialism, and
racism, and a class-based critique of law to explore the impact of criminal
law upon women, lesbians, gays, Aboriginal peoples, African-Canadians
and other racialized people, and the poor, and to probe the interlocking
relations of power.”205
The editors write that they “remain sceptical about whether it is
possible to shift relations of power by invoking criminal prosecution or
liberal notions of ‘rights’ through litigation.”206 They recognize that the
“The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms…has at least contributed
to the growing body of jurisprudence exposing inequalities perpetuated
through law,”207 but they nonetheless seem to refrain from viewing their
study of criminal law’s systemic biases as serving the primary purpose
of leading towards a more just internal reworking of criminal law. Such
a position is in line with the findings of a number of commissions and
inquiries relating to the criminal justice system’s impacts on Indigenous
people, which have found that allowing for independent Indigenous legal
systems to fully exercise their authority will be necessary for bringing an
end to the mass imprisonment of Indigenous people in Canada.208
In Abell Volume 2, the editors again rely on a number of themes for the
purpose of demonstrating criminal law’s effects on marginalized groups of
people, addressing not only “the themes of feminism, colonization, racism,
and class-based critique,” but also “issues about the impact of criminal
law and the criminal justice system upon persons with disabilities and
upon the LGBT community.”209 In comparison to Volume 1, an effort to
develop meaningful social change “through law” is expressly indicated.
In the introduction to Volume 2, the editors write, “[w]e hope this book
will prove useful for those who are committing to seeking social justice
through law, whether law students, lawyers, or researchers.”210 The
book asks students to contemplate questions geared towards honing
professionalized legal strategies, such as identifying whether cases are

204. Ibid.
205. Ibid [bold omitted].
206. Ibid.
207. Ibid, citing Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
208. Jonathan Rudin, Indigenous People and the Criminal Justice System: A Practitioner’s Handbook
(Toronto: Emond, 2019) at 6. For an analysis of the term “mass imprisonment,” see Efrat Arbel,
“Rethinking the ‘Crisis’ of Indigenous Mass Imprisonment” (2019) 34:3 CJLS 437 at 440.
209. Abell Volume 2, supra note 18 at 2.
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consistent with one another,211 and how they might utilize the Charter to
make legal arguments.212
While I have pointed out this difference in orientation between the two
Abell volumes, I do not mean to suggest that the lines are sharply drawn.
For instance, Abell Volume 1 teaches its readers about criminal procedure
through the aid of cases involving Charter challenges, and Abell Volume
2 targets not only law professors and students but also “those who work
and teach in law-related disciplines such as criminology or sociology.”213
My impression is that they each have a slightly different emphasis. Abell
Volume 1 includes doctrinal documents and topics but primarily views
such contents from a somewhat removed perspective, one that is wary
of the ability of legal arguments to effect change. Abell Volume 2, while
applying critical lenses to doctrinal topics, emphasizes how those critical
lenses can be used to develop a reader’s ability to use the law to carry out
social change. Together, both volumes demonstrate the difficult balance
that critique-inspired pedagogies aim to strike between teaching about
both law’s injustices and law’s potential for remedying injustices.
A novel feature of the Abell collection is its inclusion of a chapter
on “Colonization and the Imposition of Criminal Law” close to the
beginning of Volume 1—as chapter two. The chapter addresses “[t]he
imposition of Canadian criminal law on Aboriginal peoples.”214 Through
this organization, Abell distinguishes itself from other Canadian criminal
law casebooks and sets the stage for readers to see criminal law as a
form of social control that is intimately connected with colonialism. The
chapter illustrates that the very categories of a crime and of a criminal are
constructed by Canadian criminal law within a context laden with colonial
violence against Indigenous people, cultures, and laws.215
The chapter includes an excerpt from Forrest LaViolette’s The
Struggle for Survival: Indian Cultures and the Protestant Ethic in British
Columbia.216 This excerpt includes the Proclamation that Prime Minister
John A MacDonald made in 1883, which describes the potlatch as “the

211. Ibid at 176.
212. Ibid at 42.
213. Ibid at 1.
214. Abell Volume 1, supra note 18 at 45.
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parent of numerous vices which eat out the heart of the people.”217
LaViolette also includes a petition sent to the Prime Minister from members
of the Cowichan agency, calling for the repeal of the Indian Act’s clause
forbidding the Potlatch and explaining the meaning of the dance and its
lack of harm to others.218
The petition reveals that people participating in activities that the
Canadian state has decided to label as criminal are also political beings.219
Here, the signatories vividly asserted their collective social and political
agency by appealing to the Prime Minister in an effort to reverse the
criminal law’s encroachment into political activities that “do not injure
anyone.”220 In their notes, Abell, Sheehy, and Bakht emphasize that
Canadian law constitutes only one system of law: “[o]utlawing the Potlatch
did more than drive a ceremonial and cultural practice underground. It
effectively destroyed the people’s traditional government—they used the
Potlatch to make law, confer responsibilities and judge wrongdoing, and
make amends for crimes against the community.”221 Individuals may thus
be political and legal beings existing within multiple systems of law—
subjected to, creating, and seeking change within them.
Abell addresses the defence of not criminally responsible on account
of mental disorder in Volume 2. The “Mental Disorder” section opens
with a discussion of the legal experiences faced by accused persons living
with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) or Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder
(FASD). The focus is on the individuals living with FAS/FASD and their
families and communities. This is different from Stuart, which is more fully
organized according to doctrinal concepts, regardless of disproportionate
impacts on particular groups of people.
The editors explain that “the issues raised by the…significant limits
on cognitive capacity [resulting from FAS or FASD] have mainly been
addressed by the courts in sentencing.”222 Abell, Sheehy, and Bakht further
teach students that judges can adapt their reasoning to address people’s
experiences with racialization, colonialism, disability, and discrimination.
For example, they provide a sentencing case example in which the judge
refers to an accused’s mother’s testimony with respect to the prevalence of
FAS in a community:
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“In R v Charlie, 2012 YKTC 5 (a sentencing decision in which the
accused had pled guilty), Judge Lilles describes the “indisputable link
between his Aboriginal status and his disability” as revealed by the
Gladue Report filed in the case…The accused’s mother, now sober,
suggested that an astounding ‘90 percent of the second generation of
residential school survivors in Ross River have been impacted with
FAS’”223

This excerpt provides a lived-experience counterpoint to the more
dominant reliance on psychiatric evidence that appears in mental disorder
discussions in the other casebooks.
Consistent with the theme of contesting entrenched power relations,
the editors of Abell demonstrate that the prominent constructions of mental
disorder have been influenced by social, political, and institutional power
dynamics, and they give significant space to perspectives that challenge
these dynamics.
Conclusions: The challenge of pursuing critique-inspired teaching
instead of doctrine-first teaching
A number of English-language Canadian criminal law casebooks add
a welcome feature to the Canadian common law teaching landscape:
all but one of six recently published casebooks integrate doctrine and
critique. This flourishing of critique-inspired pedagogies is particularly
notable when compared to Sandomierski’s study of Canadian contract law
casebooks, which demonstrate a more entrenched adherence to doctrinefirst teaching.
The Charter, the systemic injustices that continue to mark criminal
justice practices, and the human suffering involved in criminal law have all
likely contributed to fostering this rich collection of critique-inspired texts.
The texts allude to the Charter’s impact on criminal law, with lawyers and
judges turning to the expertise of social science scholars.224 Yet, as the texts
also caution that systemic injustices continue and activism and political
dialogue continue to serve as important mechanisms for pursuing social
change.225 Additionally, as an area of law, criminal law attempts to respond
to immense physical, emotional, relational, and psychological harms,
while at the same time imposing such harms. For instance, the editors of
Roach write that when a judge imposes a sentence, “the state is inflicting
some measure of suffering on an individual in response to wrongdoing.”226
223. Ibid, citing R v Charlie, 2012 YKTC 5 at paras 37, 8.
224. See e.g. Pickard, supra note 178 at xxiii; Abell Volume 1, supra note 18 at 2.
225. See e.g. Abell Volume 1, supra note 18 at 2; Pickard & Goldman, supra note 178 at xxiii; Pickard,
supra note 18 at xxiii.
226. Roach, supra note 18 at 973.
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This “extraordinary…act”227 of inflicting suffering constitutes a clear,
visible act of state violence.228 Human suffering is thus at the forefront of
both criminal law’s subject matter and practices. Moreover, inequalities,
injustices, and the human suffering involved in other areas of law and social
policy, such as child protection, often culminate in, or are exacerbated by,
criminal justice processes.229 This combination of human suffering, the
invitation to challenge the law through the Charter, and the continued
oppression of marginalized individuals and groups are likely some of the
factors that have led editors to reimagine the structure and contents of
casebooks.
Despite the prevalence of critique-inspired approaches within criminal
law casebooks, critique-inspired teaching does not necessarily constitute
a norm in Canadian criminal law teaching. To the contrary, three of the
books that most strongly favour critical perspectives—Abell Volume 1,
Abell Volume 2, and Pickard—have not been published since 2012, 2014,
and 2002, respectively. Relatedly, in a review of Abell Volume 1, Constance
Backhouse writes that, although she would have “love[d] to teach with
[Abell Volume 1]” at the University of Western Ontario’s Faculty of Law,
she did not.230 After having taught with Pickard for two to three years—
and experiencing significant resistance from students—Backhouse and
her colleague, Winifred Holland, decided to teach with one of the more
“traditional casebooks.”231 In their introduction to the first edition of Abell
Volume 1, Abell and Sheehy similarly describe in detail the challenge of
incorporating critique into law teaching:
Critical feminist teaching is…challenging because the law school
community resists a curriculum that challenges antifeminism, racism,
the centrality of law, and legal education as training for hierarchy.
Some students engage in racial, sexual, and homophobic harassment
in and outside of classrooms, and other professors, by eschewing
“political content” in their courses, reinforce, whether intentionally or
inadvertently, the notion that a critical curriculum is biased and nonlegal. Similar responses are faced by feminist, critical race theorist, and
socialist professors in academe generally, but they are exacerbated by
the context of a “professional school” where the overt agenda is the
preparation of students to enter the practice of law as it is currently

227. Ibid.
228. On punishment as state violence, see Alice Ristroph, “Just Violence” (2014) 56:4 Ariz L Rev
1017.
229. See e.g. Elizabeth Comack, Coming Back to Jail: Women, Trauma, and Criminalization
(Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing, 2018) at 29.
230. Backhouse, supra note 196 at 214.
231. Ibid.
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rigidly defined.232

Perhaps, then, the most significant challenge in adopting critique-inspired
teaching is overcoming the expectations of students, colleagues, and the
legal profession for doctrine-first teaching.
I am inspired by the extent to which criminal law casebook editors
have accepted the challenge of working against the grain by incorporating
critique into first-year criminal law teaching. The critique-inspired
casebooks complicate the image of first-year common law education as
they offer evidence of critical political commitments and pedagogical
methods within Canadian criminal law education. Given the challenge of
employing these methods, the books might also provide adaptable tools
and perspectives for instructors to use. For instance, even if criminal law
professors choose to use Stuart—the 2018 doctrine-first casebook—the
sources and perspectives offered in the critique-inspired books provide
material and reflections that professors might wish to use as further
reading, questions, or guidance for organizing the structure of their
courses. Indeed, Backhouse’s teaching approach illustrates one of the
possibilities for blending doctrine-first materials with critique-inspired
teaching practices. Specifically, when Backhouse encountered “the
unprecedented wave of backlash generated by students resistant to critical
legal textbooks,” she dealt with the resistance not by abandoning critiqueinspired teaching altogether but by instead using one of the “traditional”
casebooks: “I decided that I could do more to provide a critical learning
environment in the classroom if I conceded the point, and taught with the
more traditional text uniformly adopted by my other four criminal law
colleagues.”233 At the very least, the existence of critique-inspired criminal
law casebooks has contributed to throwing into question the legitimacy
and stability of doctrine-first teaching. The casebooks show that teaching
with critical perspectives does not have to simply be an aspiration among
first-year common law teachers.
In light of the pushback imposed by doctrine-first expectations, I
propose that one path towards building a stronger foundation for critiqueinspired teaching involves emphasizing and further exploring the goals
of critique-inspired teaching—developing better lawyers and valuing
student diversity. First, the clear articulation of these goals establishes why
critique-inspired pedagogies are valuable. Second, the identification of
such goals lays the groundwork for further research into whether critique232. Abell & Sheehy, supra note 194 at 2.
233. Backhouse, supra note 196 at 214.
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inspired pedagogies relate, in practice, to the student learning outcomes,
future lawyering skills, and student experiences that the pedagogies aim
to foster.234 Third, an emphasis on the goals of critique-inspired teaching
assists in finding common ground among legal academics. As Sandomierski
demonstrates, many common law contracts professors who adopt doctrinefirst teaching nonetheless aspire to achieve the goal of using critique to
enhance and broaden students’ skills. This shared aim suggests that there
may be extensive interest in shifting more resolutely towards critiqueinspired teaching, despite the broader pressures to maintain doctrine-first
approaches. If professors capitalize on this seemingly pervasive aspiration
to instill critical capacities in students, they might be able to dismantle
some of the doctrine-first pressures.
The goal of valuing student diversity is less expressly articulated in
the casebooks in my study. However, Abell and Sheehy offer a glimpse of
this aim in their above description of the dilemma facing professors who
aspire to teach critical feminist perspectives. In detailing the obstacles
facing those who choose to teach critical perspectives, Abell and Sheehy
indirectly illuminate the marginalized experiences of students, professors,
lawyers, and clients whose values and knowledges fall outside the dominant
legal and law school discourses. At the same time as people express
pejorative remarks, there will be students, professors, and clients who feel
unwelcome and disregarded. And at the same time as judicial analyses are
presented as neutral and objective, worldviews and experiences that land
outside those frameworks will be regarded as biased.
The aims of listening to and valuing diverse experiences inside and
outside the classroom are mutually constitutive—they both involve a vision
of students and lawyers who are respectful of difference, who recognize
colonial violence in Canadian law, and who identify spaces to argue for
social justice within and outside of Canadian law. The factors that create
pressures against critique-inspired pedagogies thus simultaneously reflect
reasons for pursuing them, and the critique-inspired criminal law casebooks
helpfully contribute to showing that critique-inspired pedagogies can be
pursued in law school classrooms.

234. For anecdotal and observational research, see generally Calleros, supra note 20, and Crenshaw,
supra note 7. For empirical research on the learning outcomes of critical pedagogy outside the law
school context, see Biren (Ratnesh) A Nagda, Patricia Gurin & Gretchen E Lopez, “Transformative
Pedagogy for Democracy and Social Justice” (2003) 6:2 Race Ethnicity & Education 165.

